This dossier traces the origins and transformation of the Moroccan Sahara conflict: historical ties and allegiances, Spanish colonial rule from 1884, decolonisation, war, the referendum process, the autonomy proposal and diplomacy through 17 October 2026. It also covers populations, Hassani culture, Tindouf refugees, prisoners and missing persons, human rights, resources and trade agreements. Morocco claims the territory on grounds of territorial integrity and historical ties; the Polisario Front seeks independence through self-determination, with Algerian support. Mauritania withdrew from the territorial conflict in 1979 but remains involved through neighbourhood interests and negotiations. Morocco administers the principal cities and Atlantic coast; the military berm is not an agreed international border. The dossier distinguishes effective control, sovereignty claims, bilateral recognition and status in international institutions. In 1975, the ICJ recognised allegiance ties with certain tribes without finding territorial sovereignty that would exclude self-determination. The settlement plan accepted in 1988 and MINURSO established in 1991 did not deliver the planned referendum. The Baker initiatives and Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan shifted negotiations towards institutions, safeguards and consent. US, Spanish, French and British positions use different wording and should not be counted as identical acts. Sources accompany each milestone. “Moroccan Sahara” is the editorial designation; UN and court documents generally use “Western Sahara.” Their substantive qualifications are preserved. No map is used. Day-level dates do not imply a known time of day.
As of 1 November 2026, the UN announces MINURSO's liquidation while maintaining its political engagement. Médias24 observes reduced activity at headquarters in Laâyoune. An internal meeting is reported for 2 November, with no final departure timetable established. Parliament also plans a joint session on 2 November.
Attributed and documented positions
UN texts seek a lasting, mutually acceptable political solution. Resolution 2797 gives Morocco’s autonomy proposal a central place. Sources establish no final agreement.
Disagreement concerns sovereignty, the choices offered to the population and implementation guarantees. Algeria disputes being a party to the conflict; Morocco stresses its role. Protection of people remains a requirement distinct from status.
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Morocco proposes negotiated autonomy under its sovereignty, with regional institutions and retention of sovereign state powers. The 2007 text provides consultation on the negotiated statute, not independence as an option. Rabat links this position to territorial integrity.
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The Security Council supports negotiations based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, without preconditions, towards a mutually acceptable solution providing for self-determination. It identifies genuine autonomy as a possible outcome and welcomes constructive suggestions. It does not find that a final agreement exists.
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Mauritania describes its position in the UN report as positive neutrality and support for the political process. Its 1979 withdrawal distinguishes this from its former territorial claim. Border security and neighbourhood stability are direct interests.
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HRW calls for safeguards for free and genuine choice, return and reparations. It says it takes no position on independence. Its criticism concerns rights and process safeguards; it is neither a court judgment nor the voice of every Sahrawi.
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In positions recorded by the UN, Polisario demands that Sahrawis decide territorial status with independence among the options. It rejects fixing Moroccan sovereignty before that choice. Its willingness to talk does not establish acceptance of Rabat’s proposed outcome.
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Algeria supports Polisario and self-determination while telling the UN envoy it does not consider itself a party to the conflict. It supports direct Morocco–Polisario talks with neighbouring states present. Participation does not resolve disagreement over its formal role.
Mauritania’s government spokesperson clarified Nouakchott’s position on Lagouira on 21 October 2026, according to Médias24. He reaffirmed support for a peaceful, consensual solution under UN auspices.
Minister Mohamed Ould Bebana urged that the request to clarify the border not be interpreted as an exchange of concessions with neighbours. His remarks respond to media interpretations of UN discussions.
They constitute neither a published border agreement nor new recognition of sovereignty. The account consulted reports a political clarification; no implemented territorial change is established.
Report S/2026/781 of 1 October 2026, listed in the Security Council register, is described by several analyses as recording substantive autonomy discussions but continuing disagreements.
Médias24 and the Policy Center for the New South describe three first-quarter rounds in Washington, Madrid and Washington. Topics include possible transitional arrangements, division of powers and implementation guarantees. A transitional council remains an option under discussion, not an established institution.
El País emphasises consultation enabling the population to accept or reject a proposal; the Policy Center favours interpreting this within an autonomy framework. Disagreements on sovereignty and self-determination therefore remain substantive. The dossier attributes these interpretations: the full report could not be retrieved directly during research, and confidential details are not presented as verified.
As of 17 October, resolution 2797 still sets MINURSO’s expiry at 31 October 2026. A renewal recommendation or discussion of adaptation is not an already adopted extension. The consulted sources establish no final mutually accepted settlement.
On 31 July 2026, Le Matin describes Dakhla’s desalination plant as nearing completion; its precise commissioning date cannot be established from the consulted accounts.
A Le360 report of 2 March had already referred to commissioning. This discrepancy prevents presenting full-capacity operation as verified. The common stated objective is to combine wind power, drinking water and irrigation; urban needs and agricultural expansion must be distinguished.
Dakhla Atlantic port is another major project: the Ports Directorate’s 2026 presentation gives projected completion in 2028, not an already completed opening. These projects explain employment, logistics and resource-use stakes. Their income, water and environmental effects require measured outcomes rather than inferences from announced capacity.
On 25 March 2026, Human Rights Watch calls for the new negotiating framework to respect Sahrawis’ freely expressed will and rights to return and reparations.
The organisation takes no position on independence; it criticises insufficient safeguards in the current framework. This is a documented human-rights position, distinct from a UN decision. The central issue is who takes part in consultation, on what proposal, and with what genuine ability to accept or reject it.
The humanitarian dimension persists: agencies use an estimate of about 173,600 refugees in five camps near Tindouf, not an agreed electoral census. The 2026–2027 humanitarian plan describes food, water, health and education needs worsened by funding shortages. UNHCR works with Algerian authorities and Sahrawi structures; Polisario’s administrative role does not remove the host country’s protection responsibilities.
A settlement would need to address voluntary return, security, family reunification, missing persons, women’s and young people’s rights, and individual remedies separately. The camps should not be confused with cities of the same names in the Moroccan Sahara.
On 9 February 2026, the UN confirms that UN and US delegations facilitated discussions in Madrid with Morocco, Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania on implementing resolution 2797.
This confirms that discussions took place; it does not by itself confirm details of a final agreement. Press reports describe a timetable and roadmap whose content should not be equated with a signed peace.
Issues include autonomy’s substance, guarantees and the consent mechanism. Algeria’s and Mauritania’s participation also highlights security and neighbourhood dimensions. Talks remain largely confidential: any announcement of devolved powers, disarmament or collective refugee return requires separate evidence of implementation.
At the EU–Morocco Association Council on 29 January 2026, the European side welcomes resolution 2797’s framework based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, a position recalled by the EEAS in April.
The EU supports the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in seeking a just, lasting, mutually acceptable solution providing for self-determination. It seeks clarification of autonomy’s arrangements.
This common political position does not remove European case law on economic agreements. Supporting autonomy negotiations does not adopt every detail of a statute or constitute a judicial ruling on the territory. The dossier distinguishes EU foreign policy, member states’ national positions and legal constraints on European institutions.
On 31 October 2025, the Security Council adopts resolution 2797, making Morocco’s autonomy proposal the basis for negotiations and extending MINURSO until 31 October 2026.
The text recognises that genuine autonomy could represent a most feasible outcome. It nevertheless retains the goal of a final, mutually acceptable political solution providing for self-determination and welcomes constructive suggestions from the parties. It also requests a strategic review of the mission’s future mandate.
The change substantially strengthens Morocco’s diplomatic position. It does not proclaim a solution already accepted by all parties or close the UN file. Its scope requires reading together autonomy’s central place, the absence of preconditions and the requirements of mutual acceptance and self-determination.
The EU and Morocco provisionally apply a new agreement amending trade protocols and replacing the 2019 arrangement from 3 October 2025, according to the official EU notice.
The agreement maintains preferential access for relevant Moroccan Sahara products under Moroccan customs control. Proof-of-origin arrangements provide references to Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab or Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra. These origin rules must be distinguished from the full set of consumer-labelling rules.
Provisional application establishes that trade did not remain legally frozen at the 2024 annulment. It is not a new judicial finding that all consent requirements have definitively been satisfied. The Commission’s updated trade page still records provisional application; validity of the new mechanism and political status are separate questions.
In his 30 September 2025 report, the UN Secretary-General describes low-intensity hostilities and highlights obstacles to independent observation.
MINURSO cannot directly verify every incident or casualty account. Movement and access restrictions limit fact-finding. Observed traces, military statements and witness accounts must be distinguished; the dossier does not add their figures into a supposedly verified total.
The report also notes that OHCHR has not obtained access to the territory since 2015 and reports restrictions on expression, association and assembly. Moroccan authorities point to national protection institutions; these do not substitute for independent access. Civilian protection and rights monitoring must accompany any settlement regardless of the chosen status.
On 10 September 2025, Council Decision 2025/2053 authorises the European Commission to negotiate changes to tariff preferences with Morocco.
The text seeks to preserve trade while meeting the CJEU’s conditions, including verifiable benefits for the people concerned and sustainable-development requirements. It recalls that the previous agriculture decision ceases to have effect on 4 October 2025.
Authorisation to negotiate is not proof that an agreement has entered into force or subsequently passed judicial review. This entry explains the institutional response to the judgments; the precise status of all later trade instruments requires separate verification before export or investment decisions. It avoids freezing the economic picture at the 2024 annulment.
On 1 June 2025, the United Kingdom announces it considers Morocco’s autonomy plan the most credible, viable and pragmatic basis for a lasting settlement.
The bilateral communiqué retains support for the UN process and calls for further detail on autonomy. London thus joins the diplomatic momentum favourable to Rabat, using its own wording.
Support for a negotiating basis should not automatically be equated with formal sovereignty recognition. Institutional substance also matters: effective division of powers, safeguards, representation, judicial oversight and how the population gives its assent. These elements allow assessment of meaningful autonomy beyond its label. The British announcement means neither Polisario acceptance nor a final agreement.
