This dossier traces the origins and transformation of the Moroccan Sahara conflict: historical ties and allegiances, Spanish colonial rule from 1884, decolonisation, war, the referendum process, the autonomy proposal and diplomacy through 17 October 2026. It also covers populations, Hassani culture, Tindouf refugees, prisoners and missing persons, human rights, resources and trade agreements. Morocco claims the territory on grounds of territorial integrity and historical ties; the Polisario Front seeks independence through self-determination, with Algerian support. Mauritania withdrew from the territorial conflict in 1979 but remains involved through neighbourhood interests and negotiations. Morocco administers the principal cities and Atlantic coast; the military berm is not an agreed international border. The dossier distinguishes effective control, sovereignty claims, bilateral recognition and status in international institutions. In 1975, the ICJ recognised allegiance ties with certain tribes without finding territorial sovereignty that would exclude self-determination. The settlement plan accepted in 1988 and MINURSO established in 1991 did not deliver the planned referendum. The Baker initiatives and Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan shifted negotiations towards institutions, safeguards and consent. US, Spanish, French and British positions use different wording and should not be counted as identical acts. Sources accompany each milestone. “Moroccan Sahara” is the editorial designation; UN and court documents generally use “Western Sahara.” Their substantive qualifications are preserved. No map is used. Day-level dates do not imply a known time of day.
As of 1 November 2026, the UN announces MINURSO's liquidation while maintaining its political engagement. Médias24 observes reduced activity at headquarters in Laâyoune. An internal meeting is reported for 2 November, with no final departure timetable established. Parliament also plans a joint session on 2 November.
Attributed and documented positions
UN texts seek a lasting, mutually acceptable political solution. Resolution 2797 gives Morocco’s autonomy proposal a central place. Sources establish no final agreement.
Disagreement concerns sovereignty, the choices offered to the population and implementation guarantees. Algeria disputes being a party to the conflict; Morocco stresses its role. Protection of people remains a requirement distinct from status.
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Morocco proposes negotiated autonomy under its sovereignty, with regional institutions and retention of sovereign state powers. The 2007 text provides consultation on the negotiated statute, not independence as an option. Rabat links this position to territorial integrity.
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The Security Council supports negotiations based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, without preconditions, towards a mutually acceptable solution providing for self-determination. It identifies genuine autonomy as a possible outcome and welcomes constructive suggestions. It does not find that a final agreement exists.
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Mauritania describes its position in the UN report as positive neutrality and support for the political process. Its 1979 withdrawal distinguishes this from its former territorial claim. Border security and neighbourhood stability are direct interests.
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HRW calls for safeguards for free and genuine choice, return and reparations. It says it takes no position on independence. Its criticism concerns rights and process safeguards; it is neither a court judgment nor the voice of every Sahrawi.
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In positions recorded by the UN, Polisario demands that Sahrawis decide territorial status with independence among the options. It rejects fixing Moroccan sovereignty before that choice. Its willingness to talk does not establish acceptance of Rabat’s proposed outcome.
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Algeria supports Polisario and self-determination while telling the UN envoy it does not consider itself a party to the conflict. It supports direct Morocco–Polisario talks with neighbouring states present. Participation does not resolve disagreement over its formal role.
In a November 1, 2026 statement, the National Association of Media and Publishers called on Morocco’s press to rally around defending the Kingdom’s interests.
The organisation advocates a shared editorial foundation while preserving different views on how to defend those interests. It also invokes professional independence and journalistic ethics.
Its position responds to the Royal Cabinet’s October 30 statement on the Moroccan Sahara. It sets out ANME’s desired approach; it does not establish that all newsrooms have adopted a common line.
The UN announces the start of MINURSO's liquidation on 1 November 2026 after its mandate was not renewed. It maintains its commitment to a political solution, according to official UN information and press reports.
A smaller team is to oversee the return of troop-contributing countries' equipment and the handling of UN property. António Guterres calls on the parties to cooperate and exercise restraint.
In Laâyoune, Médias24 reports from the site that headquarters activity has slowed and its doors are closed. Citing a UN source, Hespress reports a meeting of mission officials planned for 2 November to consider organisational and logistical arrangements. The meeting remains scheduled; these sources establish no final departure timetable.
The Democratic Confederation of Labour reaffirmed support for Morocco’s territorial integrity in a statement dated November 1, 2026 in Casablanca, reported by Al Massae24 on November 2.
The union supports autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. It links defending territorial unity with stronger national participation and social justice.
These are the union’s positions on the diplomatic developments. They are neither a government decision nor a new social agreement. The complete original statement was not located on the union websites consulted.
The Union of Small Press Enterprises called in a statement dated 1 November 2026 for a stronger Moroccan international media presence on the Moroccan Sahara, La Relève and Télexpresse report.
The organisation urges newsrooms and journalists in Morocco and abroad to cooperate on multilingual investigations and interviews. It also calls for residents of the southern provinces to be heard and for economic and social developments there to be documented.
UPEP reaffirms its support for royal policy and autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. These are the organisation’s position and requested actions: the statement provides no costed programme, implementation timetable or record of content already produced.
Morocco’s two parliamentary chambers announced on October 31, 2026 a joint session on the latest developments concerning the Moroccan Sahara. It is scheduled for Monday, November 2 at 1 p.m.
The notice comes from a joint statement by the presidents of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. All members of both chambers are invited to attend.
The announcement follows the October 30 Security Council votes on renewing MINURSO and the subsequent Royal Cabinet statement. The parliamentary meeting is a scheduled step; its discussions and conclusions are not yet known.
Speaking on 2M on 31 October 2026, Nasser Bourita said Morocco would allow the time and logistical resources needed for MINURSO’s departure. He reaffirmed the Kingdom’s commitment to the ceasefire.
The foreign minister described a transition Rabat intends to facilitate after competing renewal proposals failed at the Security Council. His remarks set no agreed withdrawal date and do not establish that a departure has already begun.
He distinguished the ceasefire commitment from the UN mechanism monitoring it. He also discussed diplomatic action at the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee. This represents Morocco’s position; the sources do not establish a decision by that body.
