This dossier traces the origins and transformation of the Moroccan Sahara conflict: historical ties and allegiances, Spanish colonial rule from 1884, decolonisation, war, the referendum process, the autonomy proposal and diplomacy through 17 October 2026. It also covers populations, Hassani culture, Tindouf refugees, prisoners and missing persons, human rights, resources and trade agreements. Morocco claims the territory on grounds of territorial integrity and historical ties; the Polisario Front seeks independence through self-determination, with Algerian support. Mauritania withdrew from the territorial conflict in 1979 but remains involved through neighbourhood interests and negotiations. Morocco administers the principal cities and Atlantic coast; the military berm is not an agreed international border. The dossier distinguishes effective control, sovereignty claims, bilateral recognition and status in international institutions. In 1975, the ICJ recognised allegiance ties with certain tribes without finding territorial sovereignty that would exclude self-determination. The settlement plan accepted in 1988 and MINURSO established in 1991 did not deliver the planned referendum. The Baker initiatives and Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan shifted negotiations towards institutions, safeguards and consent. US, Spanish, French and British positions use different wording and should not be counted as identical acts. Sources accompany each milestone. “Moroccan Sahara” is the editorial designation; UN and court documents generally use “Western Sahara.” Their substantive qualifications are preserved. No map is used. Day-level dates do not imply a known time of day.
As of November 4, 2026, the Royal Cabinet says the Interior Ministry’s coordination office will assist MINURSO’s liquidation and withdrawal. Morocco reiterates its commitment to the ceasefire. No final withdrawal timetable is specified; the General Assembly meeting announced for November 10 remains pending.
Attributed and documented positions
UN texts seek a lasting, mutually acceptable political solution. Resolution 2797 gives Morocco’s autonomy proposal a central place. Sources establish no final agreement.
Disagreement concerns sovereignty, the choices offered to the population and implementation guarantees. Algeria disputes being a party to the conflict; Morocco stresses its role. Protection of people remains a requirement distinct from status.
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Morocco proposes negotiated autonomy under its sovereignty, with regional institutions and retention of sovereign state powers. The 2007 text provides consultation on the negotiated statute, not independence as an option. Rabat links this position to territorial integrity.
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The Security Council supports negotiations based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, without preconditions, towards a mutually acceptable solution providing for self-determination. It identifies genuine autonomy as a possible outcome and welcomes constructive suggestions. It does not find that a final agreement exists.
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Mauritania describes its position in the UN report as positive neutrality and support for the political process. Its 1979 withdrawal distinguishes this from its former territorial claim. Border security and neighbourhood stability are direct interests.
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HRW calls for safeguards for free and genuine choice, return and reparations. It says it takes no position on independence. Its criticism concerns rights and process safeguards; it is neither a court judgment nor the voice of every Sahrawi.
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In positions recorded by the UN, Polisario demands that Sahrawis decide territorial status with independence among the options. It rejects fixing Moroccan sovereignty before that choice. Its willingness to talk does not establish acceptance of Rabat’s proposed outcome.
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Algeria supports Polisario and self-determination while telling the UN envoy it does not consider itself a party to the conflict. It supports direct Morocco–Polisario talks with neighbouring states present. Participation does not resolve disagreement over its formal role.
Mohammed VI chaired a working session in Rabat on November 4, 2026 on the post-MINURSO phase. According to the Royal Cabinet, the Interior Ministry’s coordination office is to assist the mission’s liquidation and withdrawal.
The statement reiterates Morocco’s commitment to the ceasefire and calls for development projects in the southern provinces to continue. Participants included the head of government, the interior minister and the military command.
These instructions set out Morocco’s arrangements for supporting the withdrawal. They do not establish that evacuation has been completed: the statement gives neither a final timetable nor a count of sites already closed.
At a joint session on November 2, 2026, parliamentary groups called for a final settlement of the Moroccan Sahara issue, according to Hespress’s reporting.
PAM, RNI and Istiqlal reaffirmed support for the royal position. PAM’s representative notably called for the issue to be removed from the Security Council’s agenda.
These are reported parliamentary positions, rather than a Security Council decision. The official agenda confirmed a joint sitting of both chambers devoted to the latest developments in the issue.
The president of the UN General Assembly announced in a November 2, 2026 letter a November 10 meeting on the use of the veto concerning the Moroccan Sahara. Hespress also reported the convening on November 3.
The letter places the meeting under the “use of the veto” agenda item following the Security Council’s October 30 vote. It invokes the standing mandate established by resolution 76/262.
The announcement concerns a future meeting. It is neither a new Security Council decision nor evidence that the debate has taken place; its outcome remains unknown.
The UN plans to close 13 MINURSO sites and repatriate about 160 military observers as part of the mission’s liquidation, according to its November 2, 2026 briefing reported by Hespress and Libération.
Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric describes a phased operation overseen by a Department of Operational Support team. It includes reducing civilian staffing and handling equipment, contracts and archives.
These details set out the announced arrangements after the mandate ended. They are not a tally of completed closures; the consulted reports give no final departure date.
The Moroccan Center for Parallel Diplomacy and Dialogue of Civilizations has announced a mobilisation programme on Moroccan Sahara, according to a Sunday statement reported on November 2, 2026.
It plans a legal note, academic meetings and a network of law, politics and economics experts. Its president is Abdelfattah Belamchi.
This is an intended civil-society programme; publication of the note and establishment of the network have not been established. Its legal interpretation of the end of MINURSO’s mandate remains the centre’s own.
In a November 1, 2026 statement, the National Association of Media and Publishers called on Morocco’s press to rally around defending the Kingdom’s interests.
The organisation advocates a shared editorial foundation while preserving different views on how to defend those interests. It also invokes professional independence and journalistic ethics.
Its position responds to the Royal Cabinet’s October 30 statement on the Moroccan Sahara. It sets out ANME’s desired approach; it does not establish that all newsrooms have adopted a common line.
